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The Court affirmed the holding that Menkes had no Fifth Amendment claim, reasoning that "a 
person cannot have a protected entitlement 'if government officials may grant or deny [the benefit] in 
their discretion."'6 The Court cited 46 C.P.R. § 401.720(b) which permits the Coast Guard to order an 
unaffiliated, independent pilot to provide pilotage service in a circumstances where the designated 
association could not do so. This order is at the Coast Guard's discretion. The Court concluded that 
while Menkes benefitted from SLSP A's inability to provide adequate pilotage, "that, by itself, did not 
create a constitutionally protected right to continued dispatch . . . .  "7 
Finally, the Court held that Menkes could not sue the Coast Guard on a First Amendment 
association claim because of issue preclusion. Menkes had already sued the SLSP A for an identical 
First Amendment claim. The Court noted that "issue preclusion does not require mutuality of parties,"8 
and therefore, Menkes had no case against the Coast Guard for the same cause of action for which he 
previously sued the SLSP A. 
The Court affirmed the holding that Menkes had no First or Fifth Amendment claims, that there 
was both a state interest in utilizing the voluntary association of pilots in favor of independent 
contractors, and that there was no compelling evidence that the Coast Guard had acted in bad faith in 
failing to renew Menkes' independent pilotage. 
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DISTRICT COURT LACKED FEDERAL ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AND 
VACATE RULE B MARITIME ATTACHMENT TO SHIPMENT OF CORN 
The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana lacked admiralty jurisdiction to confer 
and subsequently vacate an attachment to a shipment of corn, where demurrage and detention 
claims were not severable from the underlying claim of breach of contract 
Alphamate Commodity GmbH v. CHS Europe SA 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit 
627 F.3d 183 
(Decided November 9th 2010) 
Alphamate Commodity ("Alphamate"), a German international grain merchant, entered into 
three contracts with Animal Feed Libya ("AFL"), a Libyan company, for the purchase of grain from 
Europe. AFL did not secure and issue satisfactory letters of credit pursuant to the contracts, which led to 
a failure to complete the purchases. Alphamate claimed approximately $8 Million in damages from the 
breach, including $3 million for demurrage and $1 million for unpaid detention. 
In addition to arbitrating these claims with the Grain and Feed Trade Association ("GAFTA") in 
London, Alphamate sought a Rule B maritime attachment against a shipment of com, which was sold to 
AFL by CHS, Inc. ("CHS"), aboard the MN GOLDEN STAR, berthed in Louisiana. At the time the 
attachment was pending in district court, AFL had not paid CHS for the com, nor had CHS received a 
bill of lading. 
6 /d. at 338 (citing Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005)). 
7 /d. 
8 Menkes, 637 F.3d at 334 (citing Gov't of Rwanda v. Johnson, 409 F.3d 368, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 
9 
The district court approved the attachment and CHS intervened, asserting that no title had 
transferred since there had been no payment for the shipment, and thus it remained the owner of the com 
giving Alphamate no rightful claim to it. Alphamate then posted a corporate surety bond as security 
against any charges, including demurrage and detention, owed to the MIV GOLDEN STAR. The 
district court, in a Rule E(4) hearing, determined that CHS retained title to the com and vacated the 
attachment, stating "[u]nder both the custom and usage recognized by the Fifth Circuit in Pollux, the 
applicable English law, there is no passing of title until payment."1 
Alphamate appealed, asking the Court of Appeals to determine whether title to the com had 
passed to AFL once loaded upon the ship. CHS contended the appeal was both moot because the MIV 
GOLDEN STAR had presumably sailed and delivered the com to AFL in Africa and there were no 
claims against CHS personally, and that the claims were not properly within the court's federal 
admiralty jurisdiction. 
The Court of Appeals first found that the issue was not moot: "An appellate court normally 
retains jurisdiction over an in rem or quasi in rem dispute even if the property in question leaves 
the jurisdiction."2 The Court stated that it did not have to retain the ability to order property 
returned to a successful litigant to issue a valid judgment, and that such a judgment is "useless 
only if there is no chance that it will provide 'concrete value' to the successful litigant."3 
Because Alphamate posted a $250,000 security bond and sought those damages in the district 
court, there was still a controversy over who would receive the benefit of the bond. 
The Court of Appeals then determined that the district court lacked admiralty jurisdiction since 
Alphamate did not present a prima facie admiralty claim to support its Rule B attachment motion and 
because the contractual dispute between AFL and Alphamate was not maritime in whole or in severable 
part.4 The Court established that a Rule B attachment can only be sought if the underlying claim 
satisfies admiralty jurisdiction under 28 USC § 1333.5 In the controversy at issue, the underlying 
dispute was based on three contracts for the sale of grain. The contracts contained provisions for sea 
transport to be arranged and paid for by Alphamate, which led Alphamate to contend that the contracts 
contained a severable maritime obligation. Though conceding that the main purpose of the contracts 
was in fact the sale of grain, with sea transport incidental to accomplishing such sale, Alphamate stated 
that the contracts were "mixed," containing both maritime and non-maritime elements. The Court of 
Appeals reviewed the two circumstances where a 'mixed' contract would give rise to maritime 
jurisdiction and found neither one was applicable in this case. The first circumstance arises "if the 
contract is primarily maritime and the non-maritime elements of the contract are incidental to the 
primary purpose."6 The Court, noting that the force of these contracts was the sale of grain, rejected this 
contention. The second circumstance, where a "contract's maritime obligations are separable from its 
non-maritime aspects and can be tried separately without prejudice to the other"7 was explored in 
regards to the demurrage and detention claims and rejected because "[u]nlike the cases where courts 
have found separable demurrage claims, the Alphamate-AFL contacts did not create an independent 
obligation in AFL to pay demurrage charges."8 Because the demurrage claims were intertwined with the 
1 Alphamate Commodity GmbH v. CHS Europe SA, 627. F.3d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 2010). 
2 Jd. (citing Republic Nat. Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 87-88). 
3 !d. at 186 (citing Elliot v. MN LOIS B, 980 F.2d 1001, 1005 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
4 !d. at 188. 
5 Alphamate, 627 F.3d at 186 (citing Proshipline Inc. v .  Aspen Infrastructures Ltd., 594 F.3d 681, 687 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
6 Id. at 187 (citing Lucky-Goldstar Int'l (America) Inc. v. Phibro Energy Int'l Ltd., 958 F.2d 58, 59 (5th Cir. 1992). 
7 !d. (citing Lucky-Goldstar, 958 F.2d at 59). 
8 !d. at 188. 
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broader breach of contract claims, they could not properly be separated to confer maritime jurisdiction 
upon the case. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, though finding that the appeal was not moot, 
ultimately vacated and remanded the district court's decision based on lack of admiralty jurisdiction. 
Anthony Chiofalo 
Class of 2013 
RIPARIAN OWNERS ON POTOMAC RIVER HAD RIGHT TO LAY FILL AND 
CONSTRUCT WHARVES SINCE RIPARIAN RIGHTS IN POTOMAC RIVER WERE 
GOVERNED BY MARYLAND LAW AS IT EXISTED IN 1801, WHICH ALLOWED SUCH 
ACTIVITIES 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that owners of waterfront 
property on Potomac River had right to lay fill and construct wharves within harbor lines of 
riverbed despite the United States' ownership of the riverbed 
United States v. Old Dominion Boat Club 
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit 
630 F.3d 1039 
(Decided January 11, 2011) 
In 1973, the United States brought an action against multiple riparian owners along the Potomac 
River in Alexandria, Virginia, in order to establish public access to the waterfront. 1 The property in 
question consisted of the land ceded to the United States by Maryland and Virginia to form the nation's 
capital. In 1846, after retroceding Alexandria back to Virginia, the United States defined the border of 
this federally owned riverbed as the high water mark of the Potomac, as it stood on the shore of 
Alexandria in 1971.Z The Old Dominion Boat Club ("Old Dominion" or "Appellee") owned property on 
the reclaimed lands filled after 1791, and accordingly, opposed the United States' action to quiet title 
and establish public access to the Alexandrian waterfront on its property. 
The district court held that although the United States holds fee title to the riverbed to the 1971 
high-water mark. As riparian owners, Old Dominion and its predecessors in interest had the right to lay 
fill and build wharves. In deciding this, the district court employed Maryland law of 1801, because 
when Congress accepted the land from Maryland, it announced that Maryland law would still be 
applicable in the lands it had ceded.3 In 1801, when Congress created a judicial system for Washington 
D.C., it declared that the laws of Maryland as existed then would govern the lands ceded to the 
government by Maryland.4 In reaching this decision, the District Court relied on US. v. Belt,5 US. v. 
Martin, 6 and Martin v. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. 7 These decisions were all based on the 
Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Chase,8 which stated, "the 
1 Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196, 223, 225 (1899). 
2 Act ofJuly 9, 1846, § 1, 9 Stat. 35, 35-36. 
3 Act of July 16, 1790, Ch. 28, § 1, 1 Stat. 130, 130. 
4 Act of Feb. 27, 1801, Ch. 15, § 1, 2 Stat. 103, 103-D5. 
5 142 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1944). 
6 177 F.2d 733 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
7 198 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1952). 
8 43 Md. 23 (1875). 
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